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Vollman: Standing Up for Consumers

STANDING UP FOR CONSUMERS: WHETHER THIRD PARTY
PAYORS CAN ESTABLISH STANDING TO SUE AGAINST DRUG
MANUFACTURERS UNDER CIVIL RICO
Brianna Vollman1

I. INTRODUCTION
More than 131 million Americans use prescription drugs.2 Third-party
payors (“TPPs”), such as health insurance companies, pay for the majority
of the cost of these prescriptions; 91.5 percent of Americans had health
insurance in 2018.3
In recent years, TPPs have discovered a new avenue of bringing suit
against untruthful drug manufacturers: the civil provision in the Racketeer
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Under that statute, TPPs bring
suit against drug manufacturers who either misrepresent the safety of a
drug or promote off-label uses. The TPPs allege they have incurred
significant financial losses paying for the relevant drug, as opposed to
another, sometimes cheaper version.
TPPs are fighting for their right to bring suit and hold untruthful drug
manufacturers accountable. The TPPs, though, have an uphill battle. Drug
manufacturers argue that because TPPs cannot show proximate cause or
establish a proper causal connection between the monetary loss and the
alleged fraudulent scheme, the TPPs do not have standing to sue. The
United States Courts of Appeals have reached an express disagreement
about whether TPPs have established proximate cause. This Article
argues that TPPs have properly established proximate cause and are
properly bringing RICO suits against drug manufacturers.
Part II of this Article examines the doctrine of standing to sue and the
legislative history of the civil provision of RICO. Next, Part II reviews
Supreme Court precedent and the current jurisprudence of federal circuit
courts regarding TPPs bringing suit against drug manufacturers. Part III
then argues that TPPs have properly established proximate cause and have
standing to sue drug manufacturers in the relevant circumstances. Part III
ends with a brief overview of important policy considerations. Part IV
concludes by asserting the necessity of truthfulness in drug manufacturing
in order to protect the American consumer.
1. University of Cincinnati Law Review, Associate Member
2. Prescription Drugs, GEO. U.: HEALTH POL’Y INST., https://hpi.georgetown.edu/rxdrugs/#
[https://perma.cc/55ZZ-APGZ].
3. EDWARD R. BERCHICK, JESSICA C. BARNETT & RACHEL D. UPTON, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-267 (RV), HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2018 (Nov. 9, 2019), available athttps://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60267.html [https://perma.cc/EJD4-X8XM].
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II. BACKGROUND
Section A of Part II briefly summarizes the extensive history and
evolution of the concept of standing to sue. Section B discusses the
legislative history of RICO, summarizes the RICO statutes, and discusses
various modern applications of RICO. Next, Section C covers Supreme
Court precedent on issues related to TPPs’ RICO suits against drug
manufactures. Finally, Section D focuses on the current federal circuit
split on the issue of whether TPPs can adequately establish standing and
proximate cause under civil RICO against pharmaceutical manufacturers
that fail to disclose certain health risks or urge certain uses of drugs not
yet approved by the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”).
A. Standing to Sue
Article III of the United States Constitution specifies the jurisdiction of
federal courts, rendering these courts of limited jurisdiction. 4 Article III
grants the federal courts jurisdiction over specific “cases” and
“controversies.”5 The Supreme Court of the United States has wrestled
for decades with these enigmatic terms, reaching back to Chief Justice
Marshall’s famous opinion in Marbury v. Madison.6 The Chief Justice
described Article III limitations on federal courts, explaining that a court
has the power to declare a statute unconstitutional only if the case is
properly before it.7
From the “cases or controversies” doctrine came another enigmatic
term: standing. The doctrine of standing defines an Article III “case or
controversy.”8 Standing to sue particularly focuses on the parties before
the court, and whether the parties have suffered a direct injury that can be
properly addressed by the court.9 The “irreducible constitutional
minimum” of standing has three elements: (1) the plaintiff has suffered a
concrete injury; (2) that injury is fairly traceable to actions of the
defendant; and (3) it must be likely—not merely speculative—that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 10 The type of injury
4. Anthony M. O'Connor Jr., Federal Courts: Standing to Sue, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 179,
179-80 (1985).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173-74 (1803).
7. Id. at 147. “The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme
court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is
expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some
form, may be exercised over the present *174 case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the
United States.”
8. O’Connor, supra note 4, at 179-80.
9. Id.
10. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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needed to invoke jurisdiction of the federal courts has been described as,
“some direct injury as the result of [a statute’s] enforcement, and not
merely that [the plaintiff] suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally.”11 This sort of injury is often called an “injury in fact.”12
Circuit courts disagree about whether “but-for” causation is sufficient for
Article III standing or if the Constitution also requires proximate
causation.13 Generally, though, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by the requested relief."14 These two types of causation
are discussed in depth in the next two sections dealing with the RICO
statute and Supreme Court precedent. For the third element, the Supreme
Court has insisted that there must be a “substantial likelihood” that the
relief sought from a court, if granted, would remedy the harm. 15
Put more concisely, in order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff
must have suffered some actual or threatened injury, which can fairly be
traced to the defendant and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision by the court.
B. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
1. Legislative History
RICO’s purpose is the “elimination of the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in
interstate commerce.”16 Organized crime was an issue in the forefront of
the 1960s and 1970s, the decades leading up to the enactment of the RICO
statute.17 The Kefauver Committee, which the United States Senate
appointed to conduct a study on organized crime, concluded that a
separate supplement to federal antitrust law was needed to address the
11. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
12. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &State, 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982).
13. Compare Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d
490, 500-01 (7th Cir. 2005), and Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 148 F.3d
1231, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998), and Amador Cnty., Cal. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
and The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000), and Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250,
253 (5th Cir. 2015), with Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Mukasey, 283 Fed. App’x 848, 851-52 (2d
Cir. 2008), and Frank Krasner Enter., Ltd. v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 401 F.3d 230, 236 (4th Cir.
2005), and San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
15. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79, 75 n.20 (1978) (plaintiff
must show “substantial likelihood” that relief requested will redress the injury).
16. PAUL BATISTA, CIV. RICO PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.04 (2007).
17. Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L.
REV. 837, 837-39 (1980).
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issue of businesses being affected by criminal methods.18
During Congressional debates, the scope of RICO slowly began to
broaden. The bill’s original stated purpose was “[t]o aid in the pressing
need to remove organized crime from legitimate organizations in our
country. . . .”19 Lawmakers specifically wanted to allow litigants to reach
the financial power of organized crime members, leading to the proposal
of the civil remedy provision discussed in the next subsection of this
Article.20 Some lawmakers argued for a more expansive application,
recognizing that adding a civil remedy would significantly broaden the
scope of the original bill.21 Yet, the civil remedy remained and is found
in the statute today.22
2. The Statutes
RICO contains eight sections. Section 1962 of RICO makes it unlawful
for any person to receive or maintain an interest in an enterprise engaged
in interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering 23 activity or
through collection of unlawful debt. 24 The statute also makes it unlawful
to have any interest in or control of such an enterprise.25 Notably, there
are no express limitations on the statutes’ application.26 Consistent with
Congress’s intent to defeat organized crime, Section 1963 contains
criminal penalties for a violation of Section 1962 up to 20 years in prison,
a monetary fine, or both.27
The statute also contains a civil cause of action. 28 Section 1964 of
RICO states that any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of Section 1962 may bring suit in a federal district court and
potentially recover threefold the damages sustained, the cost of the suit,

18. Batista, supra note 16. The Kefauver Committee was the first modern group to study organized
crime in a systematic fashion.
19. Id.
20. Danene Tushar, RICO - Standing to Sue and Something More: Civil Claims under Rico in the
Eighth Circuit, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1283, 1284 (1984).
21. Batista, supra note 16.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
23. Section 1961 of RICO provides an expansive definition of “racketeering,” in relevant part as
follows, “(1) “racketeering activity” means “… (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code:… Section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), Section 1343 (relating
to wire fraud)…” The relevant parts of the mail fraud statute and wire fraud statute deal with using such
services to introduce false representations.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970).
26. Tushar, supra note 20.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1970).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970).
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and attorney’s fees.29 Put simply, a plaintiff bringing suit under civil
RICO must show: 1) a violation of Section 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (2)
injury to her business or property; and (3) causation of the injury by the
violation.30 As Supreme Court precedent has revealed, the statute’s
application isn’t as straight forward as it may seem at first glance.
The RICO statutes require causation. In RICO, two types of causation
are required. The first is called but-for causation, which requires a simple
inquiry: but-for the defendant’s negligence or wrongful act, would the
plaintiff have suffered this injury?31 This is also called “actual cause” or
“cause in fact.”32 The second required causal link is "proximate cause,”
which determines whether the injury was the natural and probable
consequence of the wrongful act, without any effective intervening
causes.33
3. Modern Applications
The civil remedy provision of RICO lay dormant for almost a decade
before becoming used as a vehicle for a variety of civil claims. 34 In 1998,
the Supreme Court allowed a pro-choice activist group to maintain a civil
RICO claim against anti-abortion groups seeking to close abortion clinics,
holding that civil RICO contains no economic motive requirement.35
Another unique attempted use of a civil RICO claim involved union
health funds and hospitals seeking to recover the costs of treating tobaccorelated illnesses from tobacco companies. 36 Finally, TPPs like union
health and welfare funds have brought suit under the civil remedy
provision of RICO against pharmaceutical companies that allegedly failed
to disclose certain health risks or urged non-FDA approved uses of certain
drugs.37 Some of these RICO applications, although not originally
contemplated, have proven to be an effective way to address crimes that
fall outside the usual realm of organized crime. The following Sections
discuss the civil RICO provision in the context of TPPs and drug

29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Ross Bagley, Dorian Hurley & Peter Mancuso, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 901, 942-43 (2007).
31. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 26 (1962).
32. Id.
33. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 188 (1936).
34. Tushar, supra note 20, at 1283.
35. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262, 262 n.6 (1994) (“We hold only that
RICO contains no economic motive requirement.”).
36. Bagley, supra note 30, at 949-51. See Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, though, the Second Circuit determined
that those brining the suit did not have standing under civil RICO.
37. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2013)..
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manufacturers.
C. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has given guidance on how the civil provision of
RICO should be applied. A prominent civil RICO case in 1992 dealt with
RICO’s causation element.38 In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, the Court determined that in order to have standing under
the civil provision of RICO, litigants must meet the requirements of both
but-for causation and proximate causation.39 The proximate cause
requirement, the Court opined, demands a direct relation between the
asserted injury and the alleged wrongful conduct.40 The Court established
three factors upon which the “direct relation” requirement is based:
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain
the amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct
from other, independent, factors. Second, quite apart from problems of
proving factual causation, recognizing claims of the indirectly injured
would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages
among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative
acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. And, finally, the need to
grapple with these problems is simply unjustified by the general interest in
deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured victims can generally be
counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any
of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.41

The Supreme Court cited this language in each subsequent civil RICO
case that came before it.42 Holmes dealt specifically with securities fraud
and held that the link between the alleged stock manipulation and the
asserted losses to non-purchasing customers was too remote to satisfy
proximate cause.43
Next, the Court in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation determined
that a steel mill product manufacturer did not have standing to sue its
competitors who were not charging their customers New York State sales
tax.44 Although the steel mill asserted competitors not charging their
customers sales tax caused the mill to lose customers and profit, the Court
held that the true injured party was the State of New York.45 The main
38. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1992).
39. Id.
40. Id. at. 268.
41. Id. at 269-70 (internal citation omitted).
42. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943
F.3d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir. 2019).
43. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69.
44. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457-48 (2006).
45. Id. at 458.
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problem was that the injury (losing customers) was entirely distinct from
the competitors defrauding the State of New York.46 The Supreme Court
once again emphasized the need for a direct relation between the conduct
and the subsequent injury.
In a 2010 case, Hemi Group v. City of New York, New York, the City
of New York brought a civil RICO action against an out-of-state cigarette
retailer that sent cigarettes directly to residents, thus circumventing the
$1.50-per-pack tax imposed by the city.47 The Supreme Court determined
that the link between an out-of-state retailer’s failure to properly inform
New York City about the identity of the retailer’s customers and New
York City’s loss of cigarette tax proceeds was too attenuated to satisfy
proximate cause.48 The Court determined that the true cause of New York
City’s loss was residents within the city failing to pay taxes as required.49
Another prominent case in the Court’s civil RICO jurisprudence dealt
with an alleged scheme to use multiple agents to circumvent a county’s
one-bidder-per-tax-lien auction rule.50 The defendants allegedly used
agents to submit simultaneous bids, leading to the defendants receiving a
higher share of tax liens at the county auction.51 The plaintiffs, property
owners in Cook County, Illinois, alleged that these deceptive practices
deprived them of their fair share of tax liens.52 Defendants argued that if
the allegations were true, the misrepresentations were made to the county,
not the plaintiffs suing.53 However, the Supreme Court determined that it
was a foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ scheme that the
plaintiffs and other similarly situated bidders would receive less than their
fair share of liens.54 Further, unlike the situations in Anza and Hemi
Group, no other parties suffered more direct injuries than the plaintiffs.55
The Supreme Court deemed that the plaintiff properly alleged proximate
cause.56
Overall, the Supreme Court has determined that in order to bring a civil
RICO claim, the plaintiff must be able to properly allege but-for causation
and proximate causation. In order to do so, courts should consider whether
there is a direct relation between the alleged RICO violation and the
subsequent harm. Courts should use the three factors laid out in Holmes
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Hemi Grp. v. City of New York, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2010).
Id. at 11.
Id.
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 643 (2008).
Id. at 643-44.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id. at 661.
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to determine whether such direct relation existed. 57
D. The Circuit Split
The federal circuit courts disagree about whether TPPs like health
insurance companies and health and welfare funds have standing under
RICO to sue drug manufacturers that allegedly fail to disclose serious
health risks or promote non-FDA-approved uses of certain drugs. The
First, Third, and Ninth Circuits agree that TPPs have standing to sue drug
manufacturers under RICO. The Second and Seventh Circuits disagree.
This Section will take each relevant case in turn.
1. TPP Formularies
Before discussing the relevant case law, the intricate methodology of
determining which drugs TPPs will cover warrants discussion. A
formulary is a list of medications, created by TPPs, that physicians may
prescribe to the TPPs’ members.58 Whether a TPP will cover the cost of
a member’s prescription depends on whether the drug is listed on the
TPP’s formulary.59 Often, formularies are prepared through rigorous
research regarding a drug’s cost efficiency, advantages and disadvantages
of competing drugs, and the particular drug’s efficacy.60 Weighing all
these factors, if a TPP determines that one drug is “better” than the other,
the drug receives preferred status; thus, the TPP is more likely to cover
the costs of that drug. 61 The FDA only approves certain medical
conditions that a drug may be used to treat, and drug manufacturers can
only promote those uses.62 Physicians, though, may prescribe the drug for
off-label conditions or a condition that has not been approved by the FDA
for the drug to treat.63 Some cases deal with a drug manufacturer’s
promotion of off-label uses, and some deal with nondisclosure of certain
health risks induced by the manufactured drug. This process is highly
relevant to a court’s determination of the existence of proximate cause.
2. Finding Proximate Cause
The First Circuit dealt directly with the issue of a TPP suing a

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-69 (1992).
In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2013).
In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 634 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 635.
Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 2017)
Id.
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pharmaceutical manufacturer in In re Neurontin.64 Kaiser, a major health
plan provider and insurer, sued Pfizer, the manufacturer of a drug called
Neurontin, for introducing the prescription of the drug for off-label uses.65
Kaiser alleged that in order to increase Neurontin’s earning potential,
Pfizer developed a fraudulent marketing strategy to encourage TPPs like
Kaiser to allow the drug to be prescribed for non-FDA approved uses.66
Kaiser alleged that Pfizer misrepresented the efficacy of the drug’s offlabel uses.67 The “fraudulent scheme” was evidenced by Pfizer’s
marketing team’s “Operation Plan” and other evidence.68 Pfizer, however,
alleged that Kaiser could not satisfy proximate cause.69
The First Circuit ruled in favor of the TPP, stating that Kaiser had met
both the direct relationship requirement and the three Holmes factors.70
The court explained that Pfizer “ha[d] always known that, because of the
structure of the American health care system, physicians would not be the
ones paying for the drugs they prescribed.”71 The court determined that
the fraudulent scheme indeed caused injury to Kaiser because Neurontin,
a more expensive drug, was prescribed more often for off-label uses due
to Pfizer’s marketing scheme.72 Overall, doctors prescribing the drug did
not sever the causal chain between Pfizer’s RICO violation and Kaiser’s
injury.73
In the case of In re Avandia, the Third Circuit faced a similar inquiry
in a case where the drug manufacturer allegedly misrepresented heartrelated safety risks of the drug Avandia, a drug used to treat diabetes.74
Despite the FDA instructing the drug manufacturer to stop minimizing
the heart-related health risks in its marketing, the manufacturer widely
distributed a campaign attempting to debunk studies that showed how
dangerous Avandia was.75 Avandia was significantly more expensive than
other leading diabetes drugs of a similar kind, and the plaintiffs alleged
that the manufacturer misrepresented the risks of the drug in an attempt
to get Avandia on TPP formularies. 76 Thus, certain TPPs sued the
manufacturer for failure to disclose the heart-related risks, which
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at. 27-28.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 39.
Id.
In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 634-36 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 635.
Id. at 636.
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predicated multiple RICO violations.77 The manufacturer alleged that the
TPPs did not adequately allege standing. 78
The Third Circuit determined that the TPPs had satisfied the Supreme
Court’s direct relation requirement because “the plaintiff’s injuries are the
same conduct forming the basis of the RICO scheme alleged in the
complaint . . . .”79 Applying the Holmes factors, the court determined that
the plaintiffs were best situated to sue and that it would not be too difficult
to establish damages.80 The Third Circuit acknowledged that an injury to
one person caused by the wrongs of another can satisfy proximate cause,
according to the Supreme Court’s holding in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond.81
Like the First Circuit, the Third Circuit determined that prescribing
physicians did not break the chain of causation and that the proximate
cause requirement of civil RICO was satisfied.82
The Ninth Circuit most recently faced this standing inquiry in
December 2019.83 In Painters v. Takeda, a health insurer sued a
pharmaceutical company for failing to change the label on the diabetes
drug Actos to warn that the drug caused an increased risk of bladder
cancer.84 Multiple studies revealed the risk of taking Actos, but the
pharmaceutical company, Takeda, allegedly failed to inform the public of
such risk.85 Over a decade after FDA approval and in light of further
studies alleging the same risk, the FDA released a public warning about
Actos.86 After this warning, sales plummeted by a total of eighty
percent.87 The insurance company brought suit against Takeda and sought
to recover economic damages for payments made to purchase the drug for
its members.88
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the First and Third Circuits, and
determined that the physicians served as mere intermediaries in
prescribing the drug.89 Since Actos is a prescription drug that must be
prescribed by physicians, it was “perfectly foreseeable” that physicians

77. Id.
78. Id. at 637.
79. Id. at 644.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 645 (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 650, 658 (2008)).
82. Id. at 645-46.
83. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943
F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2019).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1247.
89. Id. at 1257.
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would be involved along the causal chain.90 Because the insurance
company alleged that they would not have paid for the drug had it known
of the risks, as evidenced by the plummet in sales after the FDA warning,
the insurance company was a directly injured victim of Takeda’s conduct
that constituted a RICO violation.91
Overall, courts that find the proximate cause requirement satisfied
follow a similar analysis: (1) whether all of the Holmes direct relation
factors fall in favor of proximate cause; (2) whether injury can be proven
because the TPP paid more for the dangerous drug over another, or would
not have listed the drug on the formulary at all; and (3) whether it can be
determined that physicians are not effective intervening causes.
3. Against the Existence of Proximate Cause
The Second and Seventh Circuits have strikingly different views on the
issue of TPPs alleging proximate cause. The Second Circuit faced similar
facts as the other circuit courts, although arising from an appeal of class
certification.92 A TPP sought damages for paying for a higher priced drug
that proved to have a dangerous side effect. 93 The pharmaceutical
company, Lilly, allegedly misrepresented the drug’s efficacy and
promoted off-label uses, despite lack of evidence that the drug was
effective for such uses.94 The plaintiff’s TPP alleged two different
theories of damages: (1) the insurance company charged higher prices for
the drug based on Lilly’s misrepresentation, coined the “excessive price
theory,” and (2) the insurance company paid for prescriptions of the drug
“that would not have been issued but for the misrepresentations,” called
the “quantity effect theory.”95 The lower court certified the class based on
the excessive price theory, and Lilly appealed.96
The Second Circuit determined that the plaintiffs’ injuries under both
theories were too attenuated to satisfy proximate cause.97 Because the
manufacturer’s alleged misrepresentation was not the only source of
information physicians used when prescribing drugs, the causal chain was
broken by “independent actions of third and even fourth parties.” 98
Notably, the Second Circuit did a deep dive into the structure of TPPs and
90. Id.
91. Id. Interestingly, five patients without insurance who paid out of pocket for the drug sued
alongside the insurance company and succeeded.
92. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2010).
93. Id. at 123.
94. Id. at 124.
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id. at 130.
97. Id. at 136.
98. Id. at 134-35.
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who within the TPP actually determines what drugs end up on the
company’s formulary.99 Because a “pharmacy benefit manager” and that
manager’s committee also made determinations as to what drugs ended
up on the formulary, the chain of causation was broken in multiple places
by too many independent judgments to satisfy proximate cause.100
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the conclusion that a TPP claiming
damages against a drug manufacturer for promoting off-label uses did not
satisfy proximate cause as mandated by RICO.101 Because the patients
who were prescribed the dangerous drug were the most directly injured
parties—not TPPs—the court determined that TPPs were far beyond the
“first step” in the causal chain.102 Further, the drug manufacturer’s
misrepresentations were made primarily to the physicians, not TPPs.103
Because there was no guarantee that doctors changed their prescribing
practice as a result of the manufacturer’s misrepresentations, the alleged
damages would have been too difficult to calculate.104
The circuits are split on whether TPPs have standing to sue a
pharmaceutical manufacturer for misrepresentations on labels or for
urging off-label uses of certain drugs. This issue will remain relevant in
light of the widespread use of prescription drugs and impeding changes
within the American health care system due to the election of President
Biden. Therefore, this legal struggle between TPPs and pharmaceutical
manufacturers will remain relevant for years to come.
III. DISCUSSION
The weight of relevant case law supports the conclusion that proximate
cause exists between TPPs and pharmaceutical companies when
pharmaceutical companies misrepresent health risks or encourage offlabel usage of a drug. First, Section A highlights the flaws of the Second
and Seventh Circuit’s arguments against the existence of proximate cause.
Section B discusses arguments supporting the existence of proximate
cause, including the issues of standing and the statutory text of RICO.
Section C discusses the important policy considerations at play.

99.
100.
101.
2017).
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 126.
Id. at 134.
Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 576-77 (7th Cir.
Id. at 576 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1992)).
Id.
Id. at 577-78.
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A. Missteps of the Second and Seventh Circuits
The Second and Seventh Circuits, when determining that the TPP did
not meet the requirement of proximate cause, were faced with the issue at
different stages in litigation. The Second Circuit considered the issue at
the class certification stage, while the Seventh Circuit entertained the
issue at the pleadings stage.105 Regardless of this technical difference, the
two courts used similar reasoning in reaching the conclusion that
proximate cause was not met in either case.
The courts focused first on the causal chain. Both courts extended the
causal chain in a way not contemplated by the doctrine of proximate
cause. For example, the Second Circuit stretched the chain, diving into
the structure of TPP decision-making.106 The court discussed the inner
workings of TPPs in its unnecessary discussion of Pharmacy Benefit
Managers (“PBMs”) and their committees.107 The court considered how
a particular manager made recommendations about the what drugs to put
on the TPP’s formulary and whether this was an intervening cause
severing the chain of causation.108 The Second Circuit further held that
the TPP failed to negotiate lower prices for the drug, reaching once again
to create an intervening cause.109
The Seventh Circuit similarly emphasized the independent decisions of
physicians, explaining that these decisions severed the causal chain.110
The court opined that there was no way to know if some of the off-label
prescriptions were actually helpful to the patient or whether the
physicians were also influenced by other information sources, not just the
pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent marketing scheme. 111
Both courts’ discussion of PBMs, physicians, and other alleged
intervening causes detract from the main tenant of the proximate cause
doctrine: foreseeability. Standing necessarily looks to the parties of the
case. In each case, a TPP alleged that the drug manufacturer conducted a
fraudulent scheme that cost the TPP money. The pharmaceutical
companies absolutely were aware, due to the structure of the American
health care system, that TPPs would be the entities paying for the drugs.
This is not to say that the adverse effects on patients and loss of business
for physicians were unworthy of litigation–these injuries were jarring in
their own right. But they did not attenuate the causal chain so far as to

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Lilly, 620 F.3d at 129; Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 575-76.
Lilly, 630 F.3d at 126.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 576-77.
Id.
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render the TPPs without a proper proximate cause argument.
Further, these courts omitted most of the controlling law of the Holmes
direct relations factors from their discussions and analysis.112 This was
likely because in each case, the Holmes factors would have debunked the
courts’ ultimate holdings. Yet, the Holmes factors continue to remain
important, and later Sections in this Article illustrate how the Holmes
factors favor finding proximate cause in these situations.
Finding that TPPs can assert a direct relation between the asserted
injury and injurious conduct alleged is not only supported by the factors
laid out in Holmes, but also the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bridge. A
unanimous decision in Bridge explained that proximate cause is a
“flexible concept that does not lend itself to a black-letter rule that will
dictate the result in every case.” 113 The Second and Seventh Circuits were
trying to read proximate cause far too literally, practically determining
that each human being involved in a transaction who makes a decision
breaks the causal chain. The Supreme Court expressly rejected such an
attempt to read a bright-line rule into the proximate cause doctrine.114
Further, the Court explained that “the common law has long recognized
that plaintiffs can recover in a variety of circumstances where . . . their
injuries result directly from the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations
to a third party.”115 This debunks the Seventh Circuit’s argument
determining that the TPP does not have standing to sue if the
misrepresentations were made to physicians, not directly to the TPP.
Standing and proximate cause are some of the hurdles plaintiffs must
surpass to bring suit. The pharmaceutical company is still able to fight the
allegations on their merits. On the whole, in light of the Holmes factors,
foreseeability, and the Court’s decision in Bridge, the TPPs in these cases
allege a direct enough injury to at least be able to present their case in
court. The Supreme Court has made clear that proximate cause is flexible;
therefore, the Second and Seventh Circuits’ attempts to create a much
stricter, sole cause requirement does not bode well.
B. Existence of Proximate Cause and Supporting Explanations
Having already pointed out the issues with the Second and Seventh
Circuits’ justifications, this Article will examine the arguments that
support the opposite conclusion—namely, the First, Third, and Ninth
Circuits’ holdings. This Section discusses multiple issues, each
supporting the conclusion that TPPs have standing to sue pharmaceutical
112.
113.
114.
115.

Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992).
Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 653.
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companies that commit fraudulent misrepresentations. Subsection 1
discusses the injury aspect of the standing doctrine. Subsection 2
discusses the causation aspect of standing. Finally, Subsection 3 discusses
the statutory text of RICO.
1. Injury
One aspect of standing is injury-in-fact, which is “some direct injury
as the result of [a statute’s] enforcement and not merely that [the plaintiff]
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”116
Section 1964(c) of the RICO statute specifically requires an injury to
business or property caused by the defendant’s violation of the statute.117
Notably, injury to person is left out of the statute’s text. The Ninth Circuit,
in past opinions, has interpreted the lack of recovery for personal injury
as having a “restrictive significance, which helps to assure that RICO is
not expanded to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages to
every tort plaintiff.”118 The Seventh Circuit posits that patients may
receive adverse care due to fraudulent pharmaceutical marketing
strategies, and thus their injury is more direct than the TTPs.119 But, as
made clear by the statute’s language, patients cannot sue for physical
harm due to RICO violations. Perhaps the patients may sue under
malpractice law, but in an assessment of RICO and who is in the best spot
to sue under this statute, the patient should not be a factor. Any discussion
of adverse effects on a patient’s health, although entirely worthy of
concern, is an unsuccessful attempt to pinpoint an intervening cause and
break the causal chain. But regarding injury-in-fact, and specifically when
assessing RICO standing, courts should look to the parties in the case and
determine whether the TPP suffered injury because of the RICO violation.
In order to have standing under civil RICO, “a showing of injury
requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a
valuable intangible property interest.”120 Injury can be shown by
allegations and proof of actual monetary loss.121 Concrete injury will not
be found if the economic harm is contingent on some future event that
something might occur.122 When TPPs sue pharmaceutical companies
under RICO, the injury is not contingent upon “the effectiveness of the
116. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (West).
118. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1994)).
119. Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2017).
120. Avandia, 804 F.3d at 638 (quoting Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir.
1994)).
121. Id.
122. Id.at 639.
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[drug] that they purchased, but rather on the inflationary effect that [the
pharmaceutical company’s] allegedly fraudulent behavior had on the
price of [the drug].”123 Thus, TPPs satisfy the injury aspect of standing if
they can show economic loss attributable to the drug at issue.
2. Causation
The Holmes court explained that the civil RICO statute requires a
showing of both but-for causation and proximate causation.124 These are
two separate burdens that the plaintiff must show to properly bring a
RICO claim before the court. But first, a discussion of damage theories is
helpful to grasp the underpinning of proximate cause issues in the cases.
Next, this Section will address proximate cause, as it is the most hotly
debated aspect of RICO standing. Finally, this Section will discuss butfor causation.
i. Damage Theories
Courts often conflate the finding of proximate cause with the
calculation of damages. Although related, the Third Circuit correctly
stated, “[t]his issue of damages, rather than demonstrating the lack of
proximate causation, raises an issue of proof regarding the overall
numbers of prescriptions or amounts of price inflation attributable to [the
pharmaceutical company’s] action. This is a question of damages and,
more specifically, a question for another day.”125 While this is true, it is
helpful to explain a few theories of damages that plaintiffs have used. In
Lilly, which dealt with fraudulent misrepresentation about the safety of a
drug, the plaintiffs asserted two theories of damages.126 First, the quantity
effect theory dealt with the sentiment that such a large amount of
prescriptions for the drug at issue would not have been written absent the
fraud.127 The second theory, the excessive price theory, explained that due
to the misrepresentation of the safety of the drug, the health insurer set an
excessively high price for the drug, causing economic loss.128 These two
themes, inflated quantity and excessive price, are found in each case,
either mentioned briefly or expounded upon at length.
The amount of consideration given to damages most likely has more to
do with litigation strategy as opposed to the standing inquiry. Likely,
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 640.
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644.
UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id.
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theories of damages were presented to satisfy the first of three Holmes
factors, which deals with the ability to “ascertain the amount of damages
attributable to the violation as distinct from other independent factors.”129
Yet, this Holmes factor is indeed satisfied. The Court has since clarified
this discussion of the connection between the violation and the damages.
In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply, the Supreme Court explained that proximate
cause would be lacking where the conduct directly causing the injury is
distinct from the actions that gave rise to the fraud.130 In the cases
discussed herein, the injury, economic loss, is not distinct from the
fraudulent marketing campaigns giving rise to RICO violations. Thus, the
first Holmes factor is satisfied, and any further discussion of the
complicated damage theories is unnecessary. As the Ninth Circuit stated,
ascertaining damages is not so difficult that plaintiffs “should be denied
the opportunity to prove their damages.”131
ii. Proximate Cause
The Supreme Court has explained that proximate cause is used “to limit
a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s acts.”132
The Court explained that proximate cause has developed from common
law,133 which describes proximate cause as an inquiry as to whether the
injury was the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act,
without any effective intervening cause. 134 Although the doctrine has
taken many “shapes,” the doctrine generally is “a demand for some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”135
The foreseeability of the harm is also part of the analysis, where an injury
will be considered a direct result if “it was a foreseeable and natural
consequence” of the conduct that constitutes a RICO violation. 136
An interesting aspect of proximate cause, which is specific to
misrepresentations, is the requirement of reliance on those
misrepresentations. The Supreme Court in Bridge explained that if there
is a sufficiently direct relationship between the defendant’s wrongful
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, a RICO plaintiff need not directly rely
on a defendant’s misrepresentations to establish proximate cause.137 If
129. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
130. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 458 (2006).
131. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943
F.3d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 2019).
132. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
133. Id.
134. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 188 (1936).
135. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69.
136. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658 (2008).
137. Id. at 657-58.
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there are intermediaries involved in the causal chain, the chain does not
break even though the plaintiffs were not the subject of the
misrepresentations, so long as the plaintiffs were “the primary and
intended victims of the scheme to defraud.”138
The three factors set out in Holmes are described in many ways. The
factors have been described as the “three reasons behind the requirements
of a directness relationship between the injury and conduct alleged.”139
The factors have also been described as “three functional factors with
which to assess whether proximate cause exists under RICO.”140 In a
word, the factors serve as guideposts to assess the facts of a case. The
existence of factors show in itself that this concept is pliable and not
meant to impose a bright-line test.
The Holmes factors have already been discussed briefly, but a summary
may be helpful to preface the discussion of the cases finding proximate
cause. The first Holmes factor is difficulty in ascertaining damages due to
indirectness of injury.141 The second factor deals with the risk of multiple
recoveries due to multiple parties being injured. 142 And finally, the third
factor calls upon courts to consider whether holding the defendant liable
justifies the general interest of deterring injurious conduct or whether
there are more directly injured victims that are better suited to hold the
defendant accountable.143
The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits properly apply the doctrine of
proximate cause. While there are quite a few factual differences between
the cases, the main dispute is “whether the decisions of prescribing
physicians and pharmacy benefit managers constitute intervening causes
that sever the chain of proximate cause between the drug manufacturer
and TPP.”144 Notably, the pharmaceutical companies did not argue that
the intermediary action of physicians caused the TPP’s injury.145 In each
case, the injury alleged by a TPP was an economic injury independent of
any physical injury suffered by patients for off-label prescriptions or
undisclosed health risks.146 This is the direct relation that Holmes and
Bridge were concerned with: that the injury arose out of the alleged RICO
violation.
The Ninth Circuit correctly characterized prescribing physicians as
138. Id. at 658.
139. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 642 (3d Cir. 2015).
140. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2013).
141. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943
F.3d 1243, 1257 (9th Cir. 2019).
145. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 644 (3d Cir. 2015).
146. Id.
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“intermediaries.”147 The court noted that an intervening cause that severs
the causal chain is “a later cause of independent origin that was not
foreseeable.”148 Each drug at issue had been a prescription drug, which
was required to be prescribed by a physician to a patient. Physicians don’t
pay for these drugs, nor do patients with health insurance. The structure
of the American health care system makes payment through TPPs not just
foreseeable, but inevitable. The goals of these alleged fraudulent
marketing schemes are either increasing sales or the price of the drug. The
scheme “only becomes successful once [the pharmaceutical
manufacturer] receives payment for the additional prescriptions [they]
induced,” which is the very injury for which TPPs seek recovery. 149 This
is surely “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged.”150
The Supreme Court explained that misrepresentations do not need to
be made directly to the TPP. So, as in Avandia, the Bridge decision
precludes the argument that the causal chain is broken because the
fraudulent marketing campaign was directed toward prescribing
physicians.151 Again, physicians do not break the causal chain as they are
merely intermediaries prescribing the drugs. The prescription of the drug
did not cause the harm to the TPP; rather, the misrepresentation that
induced the prescription caused the harm.
Finally, the Holmes factors all weigh in favor of finding proximate
cause in these types of cases. This Article has already discussed the first
factor. Courts already must find at the pleading stage that the TPP has put
forth sufficient evidence of damages for the case to move forward. The
evidence again is usually shown using one of the two theories of damages,
often bolstered by extensive expert testimony as seen in Neurontin.152 The
TPP is the only entity that paid toward the purchase of the drug influenced
by the fraudulent marketing scheme. Therefore, there is no threat of
duplicative recoveries, as warned by the second factor. There is not a
“more immediate victim” better positioned to bring suit.153 Finally, the
third factor dealing with deterrence of wrongful conduct weighs heavily
in the favor of TPPs. Indeed, TPPs are best suited to sue for economic
damages because TPPs are the only parties that suffered economic loss.
The Supreme Court’s precedent and the Holmes factors demonstrate
that the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits came to the correct conclusion

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Painters, 943 F.3d at 1257.
Id. (quoting Exxon Co. v. Sofec, 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
Id.
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992).
In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 658 (3d Cir. 2015).
In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2013).
Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658 (2008).
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that proximate cause exists in cases where a TPP brings suit under civil
RICO against a pharmaceutical company for a fraudulent marketing
scheme.
iii. But-For Causation
But-for causation is less hotly debated in the case law. The Holmes
court required more than but-for causation because of the breadth of
possible suits that may qualify. If only but-for causation was required,
RICO may “be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured ‘by reason of’ a
RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply by showing that the
defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant's
violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiff's injury.”154 This led the
Supreme Court to require proximate cause as well. Yet, a discussion of
how but-for causation is met in these cases is necessary, as it is still an
essential part of civil RICO standing.
The but-for causation question for civil RICO has been described as
“whether, absent [the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s] fraud, [the TPP]
would have paid for fewer off-label prescriptions.”155 Of course, in
situations involving concealment of health risks, the question is as
follows: but for the fraudulent marketing campaign promoting the drug’s
safety, would the TPP have paid for a higher quantity of the drug or for a
higher price than a cheaper, similar drug? In other words, but for the
fraud, would the TPP have experienced the economic loss, regardless of
how that loss came about?
The answer to these questions is more straightforward than the
proximate cause inquiry. The main showing required is a connection
between the dissemination of the misrepresentations and a significant
increase in sales. In Neurontin, prescription sales of the drug increased by
sixty-two percent after physicians attended a medical education
conference where the physicians were exposed to misrepresentations
from the drug manufacturer.156 Then, when negative information about
the safety of the drug was disseminated, the number of prescription sales
dropped by thirty-three percent.157 This shows that, but for the
misrepresentations, the amount of prescriptions for the drug the TPP paid
for would not have increased, and the TPP would not have incurred
economic losses due to the drug.
The Ninth Circuit opined, “logically, a plaintiff cannot even establish
but-for causation if no one relied on the defendant’s alleged
154.
155.
156.
157.

Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265-66.
Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34.
Id. at 41.
Id.
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misrepresentation.” 158 Thus, a plaintiff must show the necessary reliance
in order to show the effect that the misrepresentations had. The physicians
necessarily would have to be induced by the misrepresentations. Just as
the Court held in Bridge, even if the misrepresentations were made only
to physicians and not the TPP, this indirect reliance still properly
establishes proximate cause.159
3. RICO Legislative History and Text
The text and legislative history of the statute also supports this
conclusion. The legislative history reveals that a civil remedy was
introduced to reach the financial power of RICO violators.160
Pharmaceutical manufacturers make these unlawful misrepresentations
for one reason: profit. RICO lawsuits are incredibly expensive for these
manufacturers. For example, the trial jury in the case of In Re Neurontin
in the First Circuit rewarded the TPP $47,463,092, which the court trebled
under the statute to $142,089,276.161 This large sum acts as a meaningful
deterrence for the wrongdoings of the manufacturer, not only so this
particular manufacturer ceases to execute fraudulent schemes, but for
every other manufacturer in the similar line of business. This conclusion,
allowing TPPs to sue in the situations discussed above, is powerful
deterrence that satisfies the purpose of the civil RICO provision.
C. Policy Considerations
The Holmes court especially took into account deterring injurious
conduct.162 The misrepresentations or concealments from drug
manufacturers have serious, if not fatal, consequences that merit
consideration. In Avandia, the risk of heart attacks and heart-related
diseases increased when patients took the drug, but the manufacturers
concealed this information and promoted the safety of the drug.163 In
Painters, the drug caused an increased risk of bladder cancer, but the drug
manufacturer failed to inform consumers of the risk.164 It is not far-fetched
to say that these misrepresentations have likely cost people their lives or
at least their quality of life. Thus, the motivation of deterring this conduct
158. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943
F.3d 1243, 1259 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).
159. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658-59 (2008).
160. Tushar, supra note 20, at 1284.
161. Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26.
162. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).
163. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 635-65 (3d Cir. 2015).
164. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943
F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2019).
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is even stronger, and the finding of standing to sue is even more justified
even though RICO only provides a remedy for financial harm.
There is an asymmetry of information between drug manufacturers and
consumers. More than sixty-six percent of adults in the United States use
prescriptions drugs.165 That is over half of Americans who rely on what
the physicians tell them. Thus, when the physician is given half-truths and
misrepresentations by drug manufacturer representatives, the consumer
suffers. The TPPs are in the best, most direct position, to sue for monetary
damages. As the cases have made clear, these drug manufacturers are
primarily profit-driven. In the end, the finding of standing for TPPs will
protect millions of Americans from potentially concealed health risks or
unsafe off-label prescription drug uses, assuming suing for monetary
damages is sufficient deterrence.
IV. CONCLUSION
TPPs, such as health insurance companies, have standing to sue against
drug manufacturers who misrepresent health risks or promote off-label
usage of drugs. Proximate cause is established because there is a direct
relation between the monetary loss incurred by the TPP and the conduct
that constitutes a RICO violation, often a fraudulent marketing scheme.
Physicians are merely foreseeable intermediaries who do not suffer any
concrete monetary loss from the wrongdoings of drug manufacturers. The
structure of the health care system makes it absolutely foreseeable and
necessary for certain drugs to be prescribed to certain patients.
Consequently, prescribing physicians will not break the causal chain, and
TPPs can establish proximate cause. The integrity of health care depends
on the truthfulness of drug manufacturers. Consumers deserve
transparency and honesty during the prescription drug sales process that
is an integral part of the American health care system.

165. See Prescription Drugs , supra note 2.
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